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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
in Boyle v. Clyde Snow & Sessions, 2016 UT App 114, 378 P.3d 98 (the Opinion), which 
is attached in Clyde Snow & Sessions, PC Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, Addendum A). 
Generally, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant§ 78A-3-102 (1), (2), (3), and (5) 
(2016), and Utah R. App. P. 45 and 46, but after a review of the jurisdictional issues in this 
matter, Respondent/Appellee Thomas D. Boyle respectfully objects to the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, and as such, objects to grant the writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Petitioner did not 
intervene and that no party to the case waived the requirements for formal intervention. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court, for correctness and without deference 
to its conclusions of law. In reviewing the court of appeals' opinion, the Supreme Court 
adopts the same standard of review used by that court: "(Q]uestions of law are reviewed 
for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly 
erroneous." Id. (citing Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)). 
Furthermore, the interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review 
for correctness. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, ,r 5, 989 P.2d 1073. 
Issue II: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Petitioners 
arguments regarding its status as an "interpleader party" were inadequately briefed and 
did not demonstrate such a status. 
Standard of Review: Same as above. 
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Issue III: If Petitioner did not acquire party status, whether this Court can 
acquire jurisdiction via a petition for writ of certiorari to reverse or vacate a Court of 
Appeals decision that purported to declare a district courts judgment void 
notwithstanding its concession of a lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. "Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law that 
can be raised for the first time on appeal. Utah Down Syndrome Found Inc. v. Utah 
Down Syndrome Ass'n, 2012 UT 86,293 P.3d 241. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Statute: Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 (perfecting and enforcing attorneys liens and 
intervention) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 3 (commencement of actions), 4 (process); 5 (service and filing of 
pleadings); 22 (interpleaders); 24 (intervention). , 
Utah Constitution: Article 1, Section 7. (due process) 
U.S. Constitution: U.S. CONST. amend. V., amend. XIV. (due process) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2007, fifteen-year-old Caleb Jensen died while participating in a wilderness 
therapy program. His mother, Dawn Woodson, retained Clyde Snow to represent her in a 
wrongful death action. Boyle was lead counsel on the case. Woodson signed a 
contingency-fee agreement with Clyde Snow, that if discharged, Clyde Snow would be 
"compensated for the reasonable value of the Firm's services." 
After the agreement was signed, Boyle was told by senior partners at Clyde Snow 
to make the case his "night job." In February of 2010, he was pressured by management 
to settle the case against Woodson' s wishes, who wanted the case prepared for trial. In 
April of 2010, after management declined to approve any kind of budget for the case to 
take depositions and prepare the case for trial, Boyle's salary draw was ended, effectively 
terminating him. In June 20 I 0, three years after the case began, Boyle left Clyde Snow 
and joined Prince Yeates, and Woodson opted to have her case go with him. Clyde Snow 
filed a notice of its attorney lien, but made no request for fees and never motioned to 
intervene. 
While he was with Prince Yeates, Boyle continued to represent Woodson until the 
case settled on May 30, 2013, when Woodson and CEC informed the district court that 
they had reached a settlement agreement to voluntarily dismiss their case and they 
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successfully moved to vacate the trial dates. In early June, the defendants moved to 
dismiss the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. But in late June, Clyde Snow filed a restated 
notice of its lien and objected to the dismissal of the underlying action until Clyde 
Snow's attorney's lien was resolved. Clyde Snow had yet to make a request for payment 
to Woodson, and allow 30 days to pass without the request being satisfied before 
intervening as required in Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 and Rule 24. 
But the court held a telephonic hearing regarding the defendants' motion to 
dismiss in July 2013, and addressed Clyde Snow's objection to dismissal. During the 
hearing, Blake S. Atkin, on behalf of Boyle and Prince Yeates, expressed the intent to 
object to Clyde Snow's attorney lien. Shortly after he first spoke, he was disconnected 
and his call dropped, but no one realized it until later. CEC pointed out that Clyde Snow 
had not followed Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 ( 4) 'which [Clyde Snow] has not ... done yet, 
or by filing a separate legal action.' 
They ultimately expressed that they thought it would be a lot fairer to the 
defendants to dismiss this action, and to have Clyde Snow file a separate suit against 
Prince Yeates or Boyle. Clyde Snow responded that it should not have to forgo its option 
to intervene, although under Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 and Rule 24, Clyde Snow did not 
have that option. 
Despite objections from counsel and Mr. Atkin being dropped from the call, the 
court ruled it would dismiss Woodson' s claims and keep the case open for the limited 
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purpose of resolving Clyde Snow's attorney lien. It became clear that Mr. Atkin had been 
disconnected by this point, but the court ordered the claims dismissed and ordered a 
portion of the settlement funds held in trust until further order of the court. It ordered 
Prince Yeates and Clyde Snow to file briefs regarding their positions on the attorney lien 
(Position Statements) and ordered them to undergo mediation. The written order after the 
hearing also added that no other briefing would be allowed, including, presumably, not 
any briefing would be allowed from Woodson. 
But soon after the order, on August 9, 2013, Atkin filed a notice of appearance for 
Woodson and filed a petition to nullify Clyde Snow's lien, arguing that Clyde Snow 
failed to follow the statutory requirements for perfecting a lien. She also argued Clyde 
Snow had not properly intervened as a party in the action and thus had not invoked the 
court's jurisdiction to enforce the lien. Woodson did not participate further in the case 
. 
with the exception of a declaration from that stated she believed Clyde Snow had not 
been willing to fulfill its contractual obligations to her. 
After mediation failed, Prince Yeates filed a motion asking to interplead the funds, 
R. at 6325, naming Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Matt Wiese as the only claimants.1 
The record shows Prince Yeates had given Boyle an assignment of rights 
regarding its contingency fee agreement with Woodson, and his claim to the funds was 
based on that assignment. R. at 5082. 
1 Matthew Wiese and Boyle had a separate agreement where Boyle would pay Wiese. 
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The court granted Prince Yeates' s motion and the funds were deposited with the 
court. After the funds were interpleaded, on April 14, 2014, Clyde Snow filed a 
document, titled 'First Amended Complaint Regarding Entitlement to Interpled Funds 
and Response to Any Crossclaim,' asserting its claim to the settlement funds. R. at 5444. 
On April 28, 2013, Boyle moved to dismiss Clyde Snow's purported complaint because it 
failed to intervene as required by rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 5467-
5468. The district court denied Boyle's motion, concluding that Clyde Snow was a 
'proper interpleader party' (See ,r10 of the Court of Appeals Opinion) and any procedural 
objection regarding the requirement to file a formal motion to intervene had been 
resolved by prior court orders' and 'the establishment of an interpleader' account. R. at 
6524. 
The court ultimately awarded all of the interpleaded funds to Clyde Snow. 
Boyle appealed. R. at 6331. 
The Court of Appeals appropriately declined to hear the merits and arguments of 
the district courts findings for lack of jurisdiction stating Boyle had no appeal of right. It 
held that under Utah Code and Rule 24, Clyde Snow had failed to properly intervene in 
the underlying wrongful death case or file a separate action, that the record showed it 
never filed a motion to intervene in the underlying suit, that it improperly objected after 
settlement which made its objection untimely even if it could be understood to be a 
motion to intervene, and that the actual parties to the underlying case did not waive the 
requirements of intervention as they objected and resisted Clyde's efforts to participate in 
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the case, which had no further pending actions to participate in. 
The record showed the interpleader was not a complaint under Rule 22, but a 
continuation of the underlying case and Clyde Snow, Boyle, and PYO were not parties to 
that action. The Court of Appeals determined all post-judgments of the district court 
were void, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and reversed and remanded 
back to the district court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARUGMENT 
Clyde Snow's lien is a house with no foundation. There was no intervention, and 
no waiver. With no intervention, the case was not left open to include an interpleader 
without a complaint and with only one "proper interpleader party." With no interpleader, 
there were no findings by the district court and no disbursement of interpleader funds to 
Clyde Snow. All the post-judgment motions, filings, orders, and findings were void 
because there was no jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction, like a set of dominoes, it all 
collapses. The court of appeals was correct. Boyle was not a party, and could not appeal 
the findings of the district court as an appeal of right because all the post-judgment orders 
of the district court were void. There was nothing to appeal. The district court correctly 
and properly did not rule on the merits or arguments of Boyle's claims regarding the 
findings of the district court. The district court lacked jurisdiction to do that. But in 
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reviewing the record for jurisdiction, the court recognized the void judgments of the 
district court, and correctly declared them void. The Supreme Court cannot now grant a 
writ of certiorari and gain jurisdiction of no jurisdiction. 
A. Waiver/Intervention 
In a review of its jurisdiction in this matter, the court of appeals correctly 
determined there was a voluntary dismissal of the case between Woodson and CEC. 
Clyde Snow did not file a motion to intervene as a party in the case under Rule 24 and 
there was no waiver of the parties to allow Clyde Snow to participate. Because of the 
voluntary dismissal, there were no further actions between the parties to participate in. 
The only reason the district court had not closed out the case was because of Clyde 
Snow's improper objection. 
The court of appeals correctly determined there was no proper intervention a by 
either Clyde Snow, Boyle, or PYG, they were not parties in the underlying action between 
Woodson and CEC, and had no right to participate. Because the true parties had 
voluntarily ended their disputes, the district court had no further jurisdiction over them. 
But the district court, after receiving Clyde Snow's objection, arranged a short phone call 
to discuss the objection. Counsel objection to Clyde Snow's participation stating the lien 
was not valid, and stating Clyde Snow had not properly intervened by following Utah 
Code Ann.§ 38-2-7. The attorney who was presenting PYG and Boyle in the hearing 
was disconnected from the call early-on. But even knowing that, the district court 
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ordered the claims of the parties dismissed, and the case left open to address Clyde 
Snow's lien, despite no objections and no waiver. And with no intervention, and no 
waiver, everything that came after was void. 
B. Interpleader 
The Court of Appeals was correct in including the interpleader in the void, post-
judgment actions of the district court. Even on its face, the interpleader was not properly 
filed as a complaint under Rule 22, there was no plaintiff, no defendants, and no 
summons, and no filing fee paid. In addition to Rule 22, as authority for filing the 
interpleader, which was not followed, PYG and the district court claimed the district 
court's July 2013 orders were the basis of the authority to establish the interpleader. The 
district court said: The trial court erred in its July 15, 22 and July 31, 2013 Orders (R. at 
4677),(R. 4683-4686) and (R. at 4687-4689) for its legal authority and jurisdiction to 
decide CS's Entitlement to the lnterplead Funds: 
The Court: "I'm referring to the orders of this Court entered last July in which the 
Court specifically held the case open, quote, 'for the sole and limited purpose of 
deciding the attorney's lien of the law firm of Clyde, Snow and Sessions." (R. at 
6524), Page 28, lines 23-25, and page 29, lines 1-2. 
PYG was not a proper stakeholder and did not have control of the funds, because the 
court ordered the funds held before the interpleader. 
In addition, Woodson, who had never disclaimed interest in the funds, and who 
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Clyde Snow stated in its lien was the "owner of the funds,"2was not included as a 
potential claimant in the interpleader. The district court named Clyde Snow as the only 
"proper interpleader party," and that the only claimants to the fund were Clyde Snow 
and PYG, but PYG had acquiesced. Boyle was never considered a proper interpleader 
party or claimant by the district court and his assignment of rights from PYG was 
extinguished by the very filing of the motion to interplead funds. 
C. Jurisdiction 
Because of the post-judgment void motions and orders of the district court, the 
Court of Appeals correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits and 
arguments of Boyle and Clyde Snow in the district court's findings. Because a review 
of record for jurisdiction found the void judgments made by the district court, the court 
of appeals declared them void, dismissed the appeal without ruling on the merits and 
arguments, and reversed and remanded to the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTERVENTION 
The first issue on certiorari asks: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Petitioner did not 
intervene and that no party to the case waived the requirements for formal 
intervention. 
2 See Clyde Snow's Second Restated Lien, R. at 4925-4929, page 2B. 
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The Court of Appeals correctly determined that Petitioner Clyde Snow failed to 
intervene in the action in the court below and that no party in the case waived the 
requirements of the law for proper intervention. Testimony during the evidentiary 
hearing make it clear that Clyde Snow failed to make a demand for payment from 
Woodson until December 10, 2013, six months after her case settled. R. at 6525. It is 
also undisputed that Clyde Snow failed to properly perfect its lien by following the legal 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-2-7. 
In addition, Clyde Snow did not attempt to take any action in the case below until 
after the case had already concluded, thus, failing to comport with the requirements 
of Rule 24 and Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7(5). In an attempt to remedy these defects, 
Clyde Snow now claims that their last minute "objection" to the parties' agreement to 
settle and dismiss the lawsuit qualifies as a formal intervention in the case. Realizing the 
futility of this argument, Clyde Snow next resorts to the position that even though there 
was no formal properly filed intervention the parties waived any objection to the 
impropriety and intervention should be allowed. The Court of Appeals properly rejected 
these arguments. 
The Court of Appeals compares this matter to a similar case, Ostler v. Buhler, 
1999 UT 99, 989 P.2d 1073, saying that in that case, 
even though the party failed to respond to a nonparty's motions for two years, 
the party did not waive his right to object to the non-party's intervention); Fisher 
v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, 1 19 (holding that the parties did not waive the 
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intervention requirement because one party objected to the non-party's 
participation in the action and the non-party did not attempt to participate until 
after judgment was entered). But, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in Ostler, in 
cases where the court has recognized waiver, the parties to the action allowed ,the 
nonparty to intervene not only by failing to object to the non-party's presence but 
also by failing to object to the non-party's actual participation in the underlying 
action. Ostler, 1999 UT 99, ,r,r7-9. 
Clyde Snow was discharged by Woodson in 20 IO after declining to provide a 
budget to litigate her case and firing her lead attorney (Boyle) who wanted to proceed 
with depositions as she wished. Three years after discharge, and after Woodson settled 
and voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit, Clyde Snow claims to have legally intervened in 
the case during a ten-minute phone call arranged by the district court on July 14, 2013. In 
that phone call, Clyde Snow attempted to object to the parties' settlement and dismissal of 
the action. Waiver of the formal requirements of Rule 24 was not discussed and was not 
agreed to by the plaintiff and defendant in the case. 
The plaintiff and the defendant had already made their agreement to dismiss their 
action. The action between the parties had finalized and concluded. Despite Clyde 
Snow's failure to file a motion to intervene and over the objections of the parties in the 
case, the district court improperly entertained Clyde Snow's objection. 
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the district court in this case erred in 
failing to comply with the strict principles stated in Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 989 
P.2d 1073: 
intervention is not to be permitted after entry of judgment."'). Id. at ,r9. In Ostler, 
the court concluded "as a non-party to the underlying action the attorney had to file 
a motion to intervene, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
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for the court to have jurisdiction over his claim," Id. at ,II 8. Likewise, in Neilson v. 
Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court ruled that "the 
statutory charging lien may not be foreclosed by way of the attorney's request for 
that relief in the original action; instead, counsel must bring a separate action 
against the client to determine the amount of the fee and foreclose the lien." 
Clyde Snow still has a remedy available to enforce its lien after a dismissal 
through a separate cause of action. Clyde Snow appears to concede this point by virtue of 
the fact that they have recently filed such a cause of action in the case of Clyde Snow & 
Sessions vs. Boyle, Thomas, et al., Case No.160903744. Boyle and Woodson are named 
defendan~. Clyde Snow's separate cause of action is the appropriate forum for the 
resolution of its claim. 
The. Court of Appeals goes on to say that the Supreme Court "has noted that this 
rule is consistent with its instruction that, absent "'special circumstances,"' an attorney 
lien should be enforced in a separate action." Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 19 n.3, 989 
P.2d 1073 (quoting Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 442 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah 1968)); 
see also Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 1211 n.33 (advising an attorney to file a separate suit 
to recover fees). 
The Court of Appeals correctly points out that, "[t]he record shows that the court's 
only reason for not dismissing and closing the case was Clyde Snow's improper 
objection; no other issues between the parties remained unresolved in the underlying 
action when Clyde Snow objected to the parties' motion to dismiss." See Skypark Airport 
Ass 'n, 2011 UT App 230, ,r,r 3-7 & n.2 (holding that the trial court did not err by denying 
14 
a non-party's motion to intervene as untimely when the non-party filed its motion after 
the verdict but before judgment was entered). Here, there was not even a motion. 
Even with a motion, as the Court of Appeals explains: 
,11 "[w]aiver is the only exception to the procedural requirements for intervention 
under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." In addition, "[p ]arties to an 
action may waive the formal intervention requirements by implicitly or explicitly 
allowing a non-party's consistent participation in a pending action. See Utah Ass'n 
of Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895 P.2d 825,827 (Utah 1995). The Court of Appeals 
notes, "Similar to Ostler, this is not a case where the parties implicitly allowed 
Clyde Snow to participate in the underlying action; instead, the record shows the 
parties objected to its participation. At the telephonic hearing on Clyde Snow's 
objection to the parties' motion to dismiss, the defendants voiced their concerns 
about the court keeping the case open to resolve the attorney lien dispute. They 
stated, "It would certainly ... be a lot fairer ... to dismiss this action, to close out 
this case . . . otherwise [we] are going to continue to be at least peripherally 
involved in this matter." The court responded, "If I were to enter an order 
dismissing all claims against your client with prejudice, however, simply leaving 
open the issue of the attorney's lien, wouldn't that get you what you needed?" The 
defendants replied, "Your Honor. I just think that it would be cleaner the other 
way." 
The record also reflects that the attorney asked to represent Prince Yeates and 
Boyle in the hearing was disconnected from the call shortly after the call began. Counsel 
was dropped as a participant which made the telephonic hearing inherently unfair. Mr. 
Akin originally asked of Mr. Boyle: "Do you want me to talk?" To which Mr. Boyle 
replied: "Go ahead, Blake." But it became clear Mr. Atkin's call had been dropped. The 
district court asked: "Is Mr. Atkin on the line? Mr. Boyle?" To which Boyle replied: 
"Sounds like we lost Blake." R. at 4677. 
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In addition, after the district court issued its orders dismissing all claims, 
effectively dismissing the parties who had voluntarily settled their disputes, and before 
Clyde Snow had filed anything, Mr. Atkin made an appearance for Woodson and 
objected to intervention on behalf of Woodson. "Finally, Clyde Snow has not moved to 
intervene in this action nor filed a separate action. It has thus not invoked the jurisdiction 
of this court to enforce the lien. Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (4)." R. at 4699. 
A.fter the court's phone call, Clyde Snow misrepresents that, "[t]he parties approved 
orders reflecting the district court's rulings that were thereafter entered." Appellee Br. at 
10. 
This clearly cannot be possible. Boyle was not a party. PYG was not a party. The 
claims of Woodson and CEC had been dismissed. They were no longer parties to any 
pending action. There is no legal authority given for having to respond to post-judgment 
motions. 
In Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, 119, 67 P.3d 1055, the Court of Appeals 
approved the district court's determination that: 
no waiver had occurred because the attorney's motions were post-judgment 
motions that in no way affected the merits of the underlying action, its settlement, 
or its subsequent dismissal. In essence, the case between the parties had ended 
before [the attorney] attempted to intervene. Under such circumstances, we can see 
no rea~on to require a party to respond to a non-party's post-judgment motions at 
the risk of having those non-parties treated as proper interveners. 
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The Court noted that the Utah Supreme Court "has explained that allowing 
intervention post-judgment is disfavored because it tends to prejudice the rights of 
existing parties and "can interfere with the orderly processes of the court." See Parduhn 
v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22. 
And that, it has. 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the district court prejudiced the rights of 
Woodson and CEC in entertaining Clyde Snow's motion even after objections were 
made. 
121 "[T]he court's decision put the actual parties in an untenable situation." See 
Oster, 1999 UT 99, 19 (explaining that a party's response to a non-party's post-
judgment motions puts the party, at the risk of having those non-parties treated as 
proper parties). 
Despite the quagmire the district court created, the court dismissed the claims of 
Woodson and CEC - claims that had already been voluntarily settled - and stated it was 
retaining jurisdiction to keep a case open where the disputes between the parties had 
ended, trial was cancelled, where there were no pending actions, and where the original 
parties were excused from any further proceedings. In doing so, Clyde Snow was allowed 
to pursue a lien as an intervener, even though a motion to intervene (which Clyde Snow 
never filed) was not yet ripe according to Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 because no demand 
for payment to the client had ever been made and 30 days had not passed with no 
payment made before intervention in a pending action could occur. Intervention in a 
pending action was not Clyde Snow's only option to enforce its lien. 
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Clyde Snow complains it could not intervene according to Utah law and holds that 
the Court of Appeals "created an impossible situation for Clyde Snow and all other 
attorneys proceeding on a contingency fee contract." (See Brief of Appellant on Writ of 
Certiorari, page 20). Clyde Snow cites a California case, Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d,14 
(Cal. 1972) as to why discharged attorneys in Utah cannot perfect liens in contingency 
cases. Clyde Snow is mistaken about the options available to enforce a lien under Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-2-7. And the California case is distinguishable. The problem in 
Fracasse, was that the discharged attorney demanded payment by suing the client while 
the contingency case was still pending. The court's decisions in Fracasse protects the 
absolute right of a client to discharge an attorney and protects clients from having to fight 
lawsuits with discharged attorneys over fees while a contingency case is still pending. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 gives attorneys two options to intervene and enforce 
liens. Clyde Snow simply does not like the second option. In order to intervene in a 
pending action to enforce its lien, Clyde Snow had to make a sum certain demand for 
payment in the pending action for the reasonable value of its services and then wait 30 
days. After no payment was made, Clyde Snow could file a motion to intervene in the 
pending action. But if Clyde Snow wanted to wait and see what the final outcome of the 
Woodson recovery was - which is what Clyde Snow wanted - then after the pending 
action was over, a settlement a demand for payment would be made, and after 30 days, a 
separate action could be filed after the underlying lawsuit had settled, where it would be 
determined, based on the entire recovery, what the attorneys fee for the reasonable value 
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of its services would be. Clyde Snow wants to pick and choose which parts of each 
option allowed by Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 to enforce its lien it likes. 
The court in Fracasse also said: "The relation of attorney and client is one of 
special confidence and trust, and the dignity and integrity of the legal profession demand 
that the interests of the client be fully protected." Id. 
As far as fees, Fracasse stated: "The general rule as to measure of damages [ of the 
discharged attorney] ... 'is not the whole price agreed to be paid, but the actual loss 
sustained, which will consist of the value of the services rendered and the damage 
sustained by the refusal to allow performance of the rest of the contract."' 
Woodson contends the lien was invalid because Clyde Snow abandoned her case 
was not willing to perform the rest of the contract, so there was little "damage" to Clyde 
Snow to charge her for something Clyde Snow was not willing to do. The reasonable fee 
for doing nothing is nothing. "In Grafton v. Paine, the court observed that when a law 
partner is unwilling to prosecute a client's case, he is not entitled to participate in the fees 
generated." See Woodson's Petition to Nullify, R. at 4693-4707, at 4694 and 4698-99. 
By declining to fund her litigation, even to take a single deposition, and to fire her lead 
attorney was to shift the effort and risk ofWoodson's case back to Woodson, allowing 
Clyde Snow to sit on the sidelines, hedge its bets and wait for a free ride. But those 
issues of Clyde Snow's lien should be properly determined in a separate action. 
Clyde Snow's theory that it should not have to make a lien demand until after a 
case is settled (with the theory that it would still somehow oddly be a pending action) 
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where there are actual fees to claim does not jive with Clyde Snow's theory that after the 
case was settled and there were actual fees to claim, the case was over and it was too late 
for Woodson to dispute Clyde Snow's fees, because they were PYG's fees, and she did 
not dispute fees to PYG. Clyde Snow does not say when, if ever under its theory on how 
to enforce a lien, Woodson, and other clients in contingency fee cases would have a right 
to dispute the fees of a discharged attorney. 
It is undisputed that Clyde Snow's fees are governed by the contract with Woodson. And 
that contract states that upon termination of the agreement, "the Firm shall be 
compensated for the reasonable value of the Firm's services." R. at 5313-5317. The 
contract does not allow Clyde Snow to be paid for the value of PYG's services or time in 
the case. Ambiguities in a fee agreement are construed in favor of a client." Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996). 
That Clyde Snow even objected to Woodson' s settlement agreement with CEC is 
fraught with fiduciary and ethical problems. In addition, Clyde Snow had no claim 
involving the subject matter of that agreement with CEC to settled claims involving the 
wrongful death ofWoodson's son, Caleb Jensen. Clyde Snow was simply not a party, and 
at the point it attempted to intervene in the case, did not belong. 
It was the Court of Appeals that clearly recognized in reviewing jurisdiction that 
Clyde Snow, PYG, and Boyle were not parties to the underlying action. The true parties 
had no further pending actions or disputes for Clyde Snow to participate in. The true 
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parties had their claims dismissed. The record clearly shows Woodson and CEC were not 
included in, or part of, any further proceedings, except when Woodson filed a petition 
objecting to Clyde Snow's participation, stating that Clyde Snow had not properly 
intervened. R. at 4693-4707, at 4694 and 4698-99. Woodson was not asked to file 
motions or briefs or attend hearings, nor was she included or given notice or certificate of 
service on motions or orders or hearings. Yet Clyde Snow's lien stemmed from its 
contractual agreement with Woodson, not Prince Yeates, and not Boyle. Woodson' s right 
to dispute Clyde Snow's fees - a right she was given in her contingency fee contract-
was prejudiced and her legal standing to challenge the lien was circumvented through the 
district court's error. Essentially, Clyde Snow made its demand for payment of its fees to 
the district court rather than to the client and the district court allowed this impropriety to 
go forward. 
Finally, even if Woodson and CEC had agreed to a situation where the underlying 
action was dismissed, the claims were dismissed, the parties were dismissed, and Clyde 
Snow was somehow allowed to proceed anyway, there was no subject matter jurisdiction 
for such an action. As the Court of Appeals said in its opinion: "Subject matter 
jurisdiction is not a matter of the court's discretion." See Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 
1172, 1173-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1~91). 
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that there was no waiver to the 
formal requirements of intervention, and the district court was without jurisdiction to 
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grant intervention to Clyde Snow when the law firm failed to comply with the mandatory 
requirements of the Rule. 
II. THE INTERPLEADER 
The second issue on certiorari asks: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Petitioners arguments regarding its 
status as an "interpleader party" were inadequately briefed and did not demonstrate such a 
status. 
The Court of Appeals states: 
[T]hese characterizations of the funds deposited with the court as an interpleader' 
action are inaccurate. Although we acknowledge that Prince Yeates filed a motion, 
titled 'Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler's Motion to Interplead Funds,' this did not 
establish an interpleader action. Proper interpleader actions are asserted in a 
complaint or, by way of a cross-claim or counterclaim.' See Utah R. Civ. P. 22 
(Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and 
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be 
exposed to double or multiple liability .... A defendant exposed to similar liability 
may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim.'). Although 
an interpleader action is not limited to an original action, rule 22 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure requires filing a pleading. Prince Yeates did not file a 
complaint, nor a cross-claim or counterclaim. Thus, what Prince Yeates filed was 
not in fact an interpleader action. Further, Clyde Snow offers no legal authority to 
support the proposition that a non-party may achieve party status by filing a 
motion to interplead funds." See Opinion at to Footnote 4 to 123. 
Clyde Snow is surprised the Court of Appeals regulated the interpleader to not 
much more than a footnote in its opinion. But if the post-judgment orders of the district 
court were void, then the interpleader is void. The interpleader proceedings in the 
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Woodson case cannot legitimize non-intervention anymore that a grant of certiorari. 
While the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree does not apply in civil cases, See Utah v. 
Strieff, the general analogy applies. With a void judgment being the foundation for 
everything that came after, the interpleader was a dead limb. 
The Court of Appeals was correct that the interpleader did not have a proper 
pleading according to Rule 22, and was not a complaint, and was not an interpleader 
action. PYG stated the authority of the interpleader was pursuant to Rule 22, which it did 
not follQw, and also said it was pursuant to the July 2013 orders of the district court, R. at 
6325. But those orders were void. The Court of Appeals is correct that the interpleader 
was not an interpleader with proper authority. 
The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that it was "improper for the trial court 
to grant a request to enforce an attorney lien, if the attorney is not a party to the 
underlying case. Therefore, the court's orders stemming from Clyde Snow's motions are 
void, including its decision to keep the case open based on Clyde Snow's objection and 
its orders based on Prince Yeates's interpleader motion." See Opinion at 124. 
Trial courts lack jurisdiction until proper pleadings are filed. Lovett v. Lovett, 112 
So. 768, 776 (Fla. 1927). The district court had no jurisdiction over Prince Yeates, Clyde 
Snow, or Boyle. 
Clyde Snow says it ''was not required to file a motion to intervene because Clyde 
Snow and Boyle had been ordered to participate in the interpleader, to which they agreed, 
thereby rendering the obligation moot, waived, or satisfied." Appellee Br. at 26. 
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"Moreover, any requirement to intervene was waived, or rendered moot by the 
establishment of an interpleader." Appellee Br. at 22. Even if Clyde Snow had 
intervened, PYG and Boyle had not. They were not parties to the underlying action. The 
interpleader, as part of the Woodson case, did not have jurisdiction over PYG and Boyle. 
Boyle could not waive jurisdiction and become a party in the Woodson case anymore 
than Clyde Snow or PYG could. Subject matter cannot be presumed. 
The Court of Appeals was correct in its opinion from looking at the record that 
Clyde Snow, Boyle, and PYG were not parties to the Woodson case, so how they could 
agree to become parties to the Woodson case in order to participate in an interpleader has 
no legal authority. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in New York Life v. 
Dunlevy 241 U.S. 518, that for a claimant to be bound by an interpleader that the court 
must have personal jurisdiction over the claimants. There was no personal jurisdiction. 
As the court in Sache v. Wallace, 112 N.W. 386, 387 (Minn. 1907), stated: "[a] court's 
power to decide and determine matters in disputes between the parties in a given action is 
limited to those questions which are brought before it by the pleadings. Rule 22 dealing 
with interpleader is not ambiguous. 
In the interpleader, there was no subject matter jurisdiction because there was no proper 
pleading, there was no personal jurisdiction over Woodson at point, since she was no 
longer part of the proceedings, having her claims dismissed. Even if Clyde Snow had 
intervened, there was no jurisdiction over PYG or Boyle. Although certificates of 
service were included with motions, a summons was not made pursuant to Utah R. Civ. 
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P. 4, and no $360.00 civil fee for invoking the jurisdiction of the court for an interpleader 
under 78A-2-301 (1) (a) (iii) was paid. 
After Clyde Snow called itself an intervenor in the Woodson case for the first time 
R. at 5444, Boyle responded, and objected with a motion to dismiss and to strike 
intervention. R. at 5467-5474. At a June 10, 2014 hearing, the district court ruled Boyle 
had waited too long to challenge intervention. R. at 6524, at 28, line 3. However, 
"[ s ]ubject matter jurisdiction may be questioned at any point. The right to make such an 
objection is never waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567,570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The district court's written June 23, 2014 Order, which denied Boyle's motion to 
strike and motion to dismiss states: "The Court concludes that Clyde Snow is a proper 
interpleader party." The order goes on to say: "any issue or other procedural objection 
associated with the requirement to present a formal motion to intervene has been resolved 
by prior orders of the Court, and the establishment of the interpleader." 
The order acknowledges there were objections to Clyde Snow's intervention 
during the interpleader process, and does not state that waiver of the parties was the 
reasoning behind the prior orders. Rather, the district court states in its order that Clyde 
Snow's requirement to present a formal motion to intervene was simply resolved "by 
prior orders of the Court, and the establishment of the interpleader." 
At the June I 0, 2013 hearing, the district court called Clyde Snow a proper 
interpleader party. Boyle asked the court ifhe was a proper interpleader party, and the 
court declined to say that he was. (See the hearing transcript, R. at 6524). 
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As the Court of Appeals said in its Opinion on page 12, footnote 4 that: "The 
district court denied Boyle's motion to dismiss, concluding that Clyde Snow was a proper 
interpleader party.' And, on appeal, Clyde Snow asserts that when the district court 
approved the establishment of an interpleader proceeding within the action ... [the court] 
identified Clyde Snow and Boyle as parties to that proceeding.' 
However, there is nothing in the record that the district court gave Boyle the same 
status as Clyde Snow, in considering he was "a proper interpleader party," including 
when the interpleader was established with the district court's order on March 17, 2014 in 
the "Order Granting Motion to Interplead Funds." PYG named Boyle as a claimant in its 
motion but the court, R. at 5073-5086. The district court granted the interpleader and 
releasing PYG from liability to Boyle and Clyde Snow, did not name them as claimants. 
R. at 5275-5280, and indicated throughout the remainder of the proceedings that only the 
Clyde Snow and PYG could be claimants to seek the funds held by the court. PYG's 
assignment of rights to Boyle was not recognized by the court. "The issue as to the 
claimed assignment of the recovery to Boyle is reserved by the Court." (R. at 6323), page 
2, 07I16/2014 Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
If Boyle was not a party, and not a claimant with the right to be heard under those 
claims, and his assignment from PYG was m~aningless, and even his assignment from 
Woodson was not considered, was PYG, as the supposed plaintiff, also a claimant? And 
if not, who was the other claimant in the interpleader? During the Evidentiary Hearing on 
July 2, 2014, Boyle said to the district court: 
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If the Court says my assignment from Prince Yeates is no good, then the 
interpleader did not protect Prince Yeates as it intended to do, and it would result, 
in my opinion, in an unconscionable result. The interpleader process establishes a 
stakeholder to turn a controversy over to the courts, but the Court is now 
considering kicking the ball back to PYG saying it's a PYG controversy, and if 
that's the case, then again the stakeholder has created a controversy and 
interpleader would be improper. (R. at 6525, page 132, lines 6-12, and 25, page 
133, lines 1-5, lines 20-25, page 134, lines 1-3. 7/2/2014 Evidentiary Hearing 
Transcript. 
As in the underlying action, Clyde Snow appears to be the only participant in the 
interpleader proceeding protected by the interpleader. In the Evidentiary Hearing on July 
2, 2014, the district told Boyle at the onset of the hearing: "I'm not here to adjudicate any 
claims that you [Boyle] have against Clyde Snow," (R. at 6425), Page 4, Line 8-10, 
7/2/2014 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript. If the district court was not there to adjudicate 
any claims Boyle had, Boyle was not a claimant. His lack of status as a claimant was 
further clarified by the district court in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law: "[A]ny claim [Boyle] may have against Clyde Snow or PYG is not before this 
Court." (R. at 6332). 
If Boyle was not a claimant in the so-called interpleader, who was the other 
claimant? That flaw alone is fatal and should make the interpleader improper on its face, 
and certainly means it was not adequately briefed. 
In addition, and crucial to the question of whether the interpleader was adequately 
briefed, Woodson, according to Clyde Snow's lien, was the named as the "owner of the 
property." R. at 4925-4929, page 2B. Yet she was not even named by PYG as a possible 
claimant to the funds in its interpleader motion. She had not disclaimed interest in the 
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funds. She never released them to PYG or to the court. In fact, in her petition, she 
disputed the lien, and disputed that if she did owe anything to Clyde Snow, it should not 
be more than $:XXXXX,3 (R. at 4702), which would have been the fee Clyde Snow would 
have received based on what Clyde Snow management valued the case at. On the record, 
she put everyone on notice that she might have a claim to any funds PYG disclaimed. "If 
Clyde Snow didn't think Caleb's death was worth very much and didn't think my case 
was very good, then they shouldn't be trying to get so much money for it now." (R. at 
6073). See 6/19/2014 Declaration of Dawn Woodson. She disputed the lien, and she 
disputed the fees. Yet she was completely left out of the proceedings. 
When the district court released PYG from liability, the court released PYG from 
liability to Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Matthew Wiese. The court did not release PYG from 
liability to Dawn Woodson. She disputed the lien and she disputed Clyde Snow's fees in 
her petition. R. at 4702. Her rights were prejudiced. She had a claim to the funds and 
was not named as a claimant. The interpleader was not adequately briefed. It deprived 
Woodson of her rights, her property, and it was improper according to Rule 22, the Utah 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. 
, 
Without Woodson, and without any other parties, there was no one for Clyde 
Snow to enforce its lien against. Boyle, as an assignee of PYG could have been a proper 
claimant, but PYG, as the stakeholder who gave an assignment to Boyle could not be a 
3 Because the settlement in the Woodson case was confidential, Respondent has redacted 
any dollar amounts referring in any way to the settlement fees. 
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stakeholder and a claimant, as the district court suggested. Said the district court: "The 
uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that allocating the fees between firms on the basis 
of the comparative hours worked by each firm is an appropriate methodology to be 
applied in this contingency case. R. at 6313, page 5, Trial Court's 7/16/2014 Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The court had no jurisdiction over Woodson after she voluntarily dismissed her 
claims with CEC. During the interpleader, the court never claimed to have jurisdiction of 
her. Yet the court also did not have jurisdiction of PYO or Boyle, because they were not 
parties to the Woodson case. And even if the court did have jurisdiction of Boyle, the 
lien had to be enforced against Woodson, because she was the one Clyde Snow had a 
contingency fee agreement with, R. at 5316-5317. There was no contract or fee-sharing 
agreement between Clyde Snow and PYO. 
PYO was not a party to the underlying action. Boyle was not a party to the 
underlying lawsuit and Woodson was not a party to the interpleader. As a result, neither 
could be a part of the interpleader. There was no jurisdiction over either of them, and 
there was no one for Clyde Snow to enforce a lien against in an interpleader against. 
Clyde Snow claims in its brief that if PYO had initiated an actual lawsuit and named itself 
as a plaintiff, the problems would have "evaporated." (See Brief of Appellant On Writ of 
Certiorari, page 33). But PYO did not initiate a lawsuit. And even if PYO had properly 
followed Rule 22, the problems would not have "evaporated." Not filing a proper 
pleading according to Rule 22 disqualified the PYO's motion as a pleading, but the 
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problems went beyond that. 
The interpleader was improper and could not be adequately briefed by Clyde Snow 
and addressed by the court because of other flaws. Woodson was excluded as a potential 
claimant, even though she disputed the lien and the fees in the telephonic hearing, in her 
petition to nullify lien, and in her affidavit. PYO, as a stakeholder, did not have control 
of the funds. The court ordered the funds into trust until further order of the court in its 
July 31, 2013 orders. R. at 4689. The court had control of the funds, and the court could 
not have been the stakeholder. Boyle had a possible claim against PYO for breach of the 
employment contract that went beyond a claim to the funds that the district court had no 
jurisdiction over. 
Either Boyle was a party to the interpleader or he was not. If he was a nonparty to 
the underlying action, but became a party without intervention through the interpleader 
and there was a fmal, appealable order, then the Court of Appeals should have given him 
appeal of right. But if he was a nonparty to the underlying action as the Court 
determined, and did not become a party through the interpleader, which was not a 
separate action, then he correctly had no appeal of right. Clyde Snow has shown no legal 
authority for how it was the only proper interpleader party, with a stakeholder that was 
also considered a claimant, that had given up its interest, as part of an underlying action, 
without intervention, leading to a fmal order by the district court, disbursing funds from 
the settlement of the owner of the property, but who was not involved in the proceeding. 
This was not form over substance as Clyde Snow claims (See Brief of Appellant 
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on Writ of Certiorari, page 32). This was just nonsense over form. 
The interpleader, which stated its authority came from the July 2013 court orders 
and Rule 22, sidestepped Rule 22 (interpleaders), Rule 3 (civil action commencement), 
and Rule 4 (summons), Rule 24 (intervention), Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (enforcing an 
attorneys lien). It also sidestepped the contingency fee agreement between Woodson and 
Clyde Snow that governed Clyde Snow's fees, and cut out the client out in an attempt to 
enforce a lien without having to involve the client and comply with Utah law. The 
"form" of those laws Clyde Snow dislikes so much protects a client's rights as well as the 
rights of attorneys. And then there are all the due process issues that come with there 
being only one party in a proceeding, a nonparty at that, being given property that the 
nonparty states on the record belongs to someone else. 4 
"A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of 
law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has 
the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction." Wuest v. 
Wuest, 127 P2d 934,937. 
If Woodson was still a party during the interpleader proceedings, her rights were 
prejudiced by the district court. If she was not still a party in her case, then Clyde Snow 
was the only party in both the underlying action and in the interpleader. But Woodson 
4 See Clyde Snow's Second Restated Lien, page 2 B. "The name of the client who is the 
owner of the property subject to this attorneys' lien (Utah Code Ann. 38-2-7 (5Xb)_: 
Dawn Woodson, individually .... " Rat 4925. 
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was not a part of the interpleader, because PYG, Clyde Snow, and the district court did 
not name her as a claimant. 
Woodson' s claims were not briefed at all. Her potential right to be a claimant was 
not even considered, yet Clyde Snow named her in its lien as the owner of the property in 
question. R. at 4925-4929. 
Clyde Snow states: "matters were fully briefed and addressed by the court without 
[any party asserting] that the court lacked jurisdiction." But Boyle (who was not a party) 
did not consent to the interpleader R. at 5211 or agree with jurisdiction in the matter. 
And, as a nonparty, he was unable to assert anything. 
Clyde Snow stated the trial court was vested with jurisdiction over the 
interpleader, R. at 544 7. Boyle did not agree the court had jurisdiction in the interpleader, 
R. at 5518. Ifhe was truly a party and a claimant to an interpleader, he challenges the 
jurisdiction of it now. "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time" and "jurisdiction, once 
challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
495 F 2d 906, 910. Woodson also challenged jurisdiction of the district court in the 
petition to nullify. 
Clyde Snow filed a complaint to foreclose its lien in the interpleader proceeding 
and declared itself an "intervener," R. at 5446. There was a certificate of service from 
Clyde Snow to Boyle. Although Boyle was a nonparty to the underlying action, he filed a 
Motion to Dismiss and Strike Intervention. R. at 5467-5474. The motion was denied. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized in its Opinion, the district court said Boyle took too 
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long to object, 110. The court presented no legal authority that Boyle, as a nonparty, had 
taken too long to object in the "interpleader." And since the interpleader, as Clyde Snow 
claims, was some sort of new event that triggered a clean slate where intervention was no 
longer necessary, the timeliness of Boyle's objection should have not been a question. 
Clyde Snow claims Boyle agreed with the court that his objection was untimely. In the 
hearing, he only acknowledged and was perplexed that based on the July 2013 orders, the 
district court was the playing by a set of rules that did not make sense to him. 5 
Clyde Snow asserts that the funds ''were deposited by Ms. Woodson's counsel in 
the underlying case (PYG). R. 5284-88." But PYG was not representing Woodson at this 
time and never claimed to still be her counsel. The last Notice of Appearance for 
Woodson, filed on August 9, 2013, was filed by Blake Atkin on August 9, not PYG. 
Furthermore, even if the interpleader had been an actual interpleader, and PYG 
was her counsel, PYG neglected to consider or name Woodson as a potential claimant of 
. the funds it held in trust. Woodson put PYG on notice in her Petition to Nullify Lien that 
it would be unconscionable for Clyde Snow to receive more than $XXXXX in fees. R. at 
4702. If PYG had no interest in the funds, Woodson potentially did. She never 
disclaimed interest, she was never asked if she disclaimed interest, and from her Petition, 
she made it clear that anything paid to Clyde Snow over $XXXXX she disputed. PYG 
still had a fiduciary duty to her, but ignored her. Clyde Snow had a fiduciary duty to her, 
5 See the transcript of the June 10, 2014 hearing at R. 6524. 
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and ignored her. The district court effectively dismissed her from the underlying case, 
and ignored her objections in her Petition and in her sworn declaration related to Clyde 
Snow's lien. Yet it was her contract with Clyde Snow that governed Clyde Snow's fees, 
not the district court, and not an improper interpleader. And that contract gave her the 
right to Clyde Snow's dispute fees, and the proceedings ordered by the district court 
prejudiced her right to do so. 
A California court in Mojtahedi v. Vargas (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 974,976, 
required that the former client must be named as a party to the separate, independent 
action to establish the existence and validity of an attorney fee lien. The Mojtahedi court 
concluded that without bringing a separate action against the clients, a former attorney 
cannot establish -the existence, amount, and enforceability of his lien on settlement 
funds. (Id. at p. 979.) The court's reasoning focused on the significance of the plaintiff's 
choice not to name his former clients as a party. The court noted that the plaintiff's time 
log would be-useful to adjudicate the reasonable value of plaintiff's services in a 
separate action against the clients, but it was insufficient to state a claim against the 
successor attorney. (Id. at p. 978.) It went on to emphasize -the attorney's lien is only 
enforceable after the attorney adjudicates the value and validity of the lien in a separate 
action against his client. 
Unlike other liens, "an attorney's lien is not created by the mere fact that an 
attorney has performed services in a case." Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2002) 99 
Cal.App.4th 1168, 1172. 
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It is well established that "[ a ]fter the client obtains a judgment, the attorney must 
bring a separate, independent action against the client to establish the existence of the 
lien, to determine the amount of the lien, and to enforce it."' Brown v. Superior Court 
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 320, 328. Therefore, he has yet to establish the value or validity 
of his purported lien. 
Clyde Snow's contract for fees was with Woodson, not with PYG or Boyle. 
Prince Yeates was not a party. Clyde Snow was not a party. Boyle was not a party. The 
Court of Appeals got it right. The underlying case was over. The interpleader was not an 
interpleader as PYG did not file a complaint and was not a plaintiff. It did not include 
Woodson as a possible claimant of the settlement fees, even though she was the owner of 
the settlement. 
Clyde Snow wants the Supreme Court to remove the client from the process of 
enforcing a lien. Clyde Snow and the court eliminated the client from the proceeding. 
Her right to due process in the lien process was violated. 
Clyde Snow states "[a] claim to enforce an attorney's lien invokes the district 
court's equitable jurisdiction." Appellee Br. at 2. And "[a]n interpleader is established 
and administered pursuant to a district court's equitable jurisdiction." But there was no 
jurisdiction. 
Clyde Snow claims Boyle was "individually a party to the interpleader 
proceeding." Appellee Br. at 30. While Boyle disputes the district court considered him a 
proper claimant, Clyde Snow does not state how he became a party. Clyde Snow claims 
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Boyle "failed to present evidence in support of a claim or right by which he could 
personally recover attorney's fees from the interpleader res." Appellee Br. at 18. It was 
the assignment of rights from PYG that allowed Boyle to receive fees as PYG's assignee 
who stood in PYG's shoes. "The common law puts the assignee in the assignor's shoes." 
Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB & G Eng'g, Inc., 2010 UT 6,, 13,230 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2010). 
It is well recognized that "[t]he assignee [stands] in the shoes of the assignor." John E. 
Murray, Jr., Corbin on Contracts§ 51.1 (rev. ed.2007). 
"The purpose of the interpleader statute was to give the stakeholder protection, but 
in nowise to change the rights of the claimants by its operation." Lee v. West Coast Life 
Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, ,10 (9th Cir. 2012). Clyde Snow provides no legal support for 
the destruction of Boyle's assigned rights via filing of the interpleader. Clyde Snow only 
states the assignment was ofno consequence because PYG "disclaimed any interest in or 
right to the interpleaded funds." Appellee Br. at 27. 
Clyde Snow claims ''the district court did not disregard Boyle's claimed 
assignment from PYG." Appellee Br. at 27. But the court declined to hear from Boyle as 
PYG's assignee. The district court stated in its findings that the court had to give Clyde 
Snow a portion of PY G's fees because ''the Court notes that PYG has acquiesced in that 
division of fees." R. at 6330. Clyde Snow and the district court do not explain why the 
assignment of rights did not matter, and even if it did not matter, the court never 
considered giving the fees that "PYG acquiesced" back to Woodson. 
Clyde Snow states ''the district court ruled that the evidentiary hearing with regard 
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to the interpleader res and Clyde Snow's lien would be limited to the resolution of claims 
associated with the ability to recover attorney's fees." Appellee Br. at 16. 
The court limited the interpleader and refused to hear Boyle's claims, or consider what 
claims Dawn might have, and then found "[Boyle] has presented no facts that would 
indicate that the amount of Clyde Snow's claimed lien is unfair or unreasonable." R. at 
6330-6331. 
The district court, at the outset of the evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2014, refused 
to hear Boyle's claims. R. at 6332 and Rat 6525, p. 4. The court declined to hear any 
claims Boyle had against Clyde Snow. R. at 6330. The court also declined to allow 
Woodson's rights to be part of the evidentiary hearing. R. at 6525, p. 4. Clyde Snow 
contends Woodson had no more rights under contingency fee agreement with Clyde 
Snow, and only Clyde Snow had rights, stating she "paid a single contingent fee to PYG, 
apparently willingly, in accordance with her contingent fee agreement with that firm." 
Although Woodson objected to the validity of Clyde Snow's lien and to Clyde Snow 
receiving more than $XXXXX, Clyde Snow claims ''t]here is no record of her objecting 
in any way to the total amount of the fee earned by the two law firms and collected by 
PYG, and thus no basis for a claim that her interests were prejudiced." Appellee Br. at 
31. Clyde Snow wants to piggy-back onto PYG's contract with Woodson. But PYG and 
Clyde Snow did not have any kind of contract or shared fee agreement. 
Clyde Snow fails to acknowledge Woodson had rights through her contingency fee 
agreement with Clyde Snow, separate from contingency fee agreement with PYG. R. at 
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5714-5718. Clyde Snow contends Woodson contract with PYG eliminated her rights 
under her contract with Clyde Snow to dispute fees. Yet Clyde Snow relied on the 
contingency fee agreement with Woodson for its lien. But her rights in the agreement 
and the protections afforded to her through Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7and Rule 24 were 
ignored. Clyde Snow named Dawn Woodson as the owner of the property subject to its 
lien when filing its restated and amended lien in January of 2014 in its Second Restated 
Lien. 
But in the interpleader, there was no service or summons on Woodson, there was 
no delivery of a complaint to her or warning that if she did not respond she would be in 
default judgment. In its restated lien, Clyde Snow named Woodson as "the client who is 
the owner of the property subject to this attorney's lien" (Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7 (5) 
(b). (page 2, January 2014). As the owner of the property, and as a potential claimant to 
the fees held by PYG, Woodson should have been named as a claimant by PYG in the 
supposed interpleader and her disinterest and rights determined. It was not adequately 
briefed. 
Clyde Snow also provides no legal authority for why the mere filing of the 
interpleader extinguished Boyle's rights or claim regarding his assignment of rights from 
both PYG and Woodson. She had the rights under her contingency fee agreement. But 
Clyde Snow's fees were assumed by the court to be valid and undisputed before a 
demand was ever made. The court took jurisdiction and allowed Clyde Snow to 
improperly use the cloak of an interpleader proceeding within a dismissed lawsuit to 
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intervene, become a party, and remove the real party- Woodson - from the proceeding 
and enforce its lien against her. Woodson was denied due process in this process. 
If Clyde Snow can show there was a proper plaintiff and an opposing defendants 
in the interpleader, procedural due process requires that the defendants receive adequate 
notice of the pending action and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that affected 
his or her interests. In the interpleader action, the court determined Boyle had no 
standing to have his claims heard and that his contractual assignment of rights from PYG 
had no merit, distinguishing rights he had before the proceeding. If Woodson was the 
opposing party and defendant, she was never named as such, she was never given notice 
of the interpleader or the foreclosure of Clyde Snow's lien and was also not given an 
opportunity to be heard in the proceeding. 
If a client disputes a lien, which happened in the telephonic hearing, and disputes 
the fees, which happened in the petition, a separate action is needed or the arbitration 
clause of the contingency fee contract would have to be the means to resolve the dispute, 
rather than a summary proceeding where the client who disputed the lien and the fees was 
not involved. 
The Court of Appeals is correct in its analysis. Boyle did not receive a summons 
under Rule 4. He had not intervened in the underlying action. He did not have an appeal 
of right. PYG, Clyde Snow, and Boyle were all nonparties in the underlying action. And 
while Boyle was named as a claimant in the interpleader by PYG, PYG, who was also a 
nonparty, could not decide on its own that Boyle and Clyde Snow were "parties." And 
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Woodson, who should have been named as a claimant in any kind of proper interpleader 
action, was left out altogether. 
"Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of 
law, court is deprived of juris." Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739. The court 
denied Woodson due process given to her in her CF A with Clyde Snow, in Utah Code 
Ann.§ 38-2-7, the Utah Constitution, and in the U.S. Constitution. 
The interpleader was a final and conclusive adjudication of not only Woodson's 
rights, but to Boyle's rights, who the Court of Appeals correctly ruled along with PYG 
and Clyde Snow was a nonparty. The interpleader was improper and was not adequately 
briefed regarding critical and controlling issues that were not addressed by the district 
court. 
"No one's rights are intended to be altered by paying the fund into the court." 
Vogel v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.) 55 F.(2d) 205. 
"The purpose of the interpleader statute was to give the stakeholder protection, but 
in nowise to change the rights of the claimants by its operation.... We think Congress 
had no intention to permit ... destruction of acquired rights [ under state law], if indeed it 
had power so to do. Lee v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012). 
"Interpleader is a procedural device not intended to alter substantive rights." Id. 
Clyde Snow wants this Court to waive the requirements for following Utah Code 
Ann.§ 38-2-7, Rule 24, and Rule 22 in enforcing an attorney's lien after discharge. Utah 
law protecting an attorney's right to enforce a lien, is also intended to protect the rights of 
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clients. 
An interpleader that was not a complaint, but rather was part of an underlying 
action with no parties, could not be adequately briefed where there was no plaintiff, no 
defendants, and the potential claims of both Woodson and Boyle were not considered, 
yet a final order was issued, denying due process. 
III. JURISDICTION 
The third issue on certiorari asks: 
If Petitioner did not acquire party status, whether this Court can acquire 
jurisdiction via a petition for writ of certiorari to reverse or vacate a Court of 
Appeals decision that purported to declare a district courts judgment void 
notwithstanding its concession of a lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
The Utah Constitution addresses jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Article VIII, 
Section 3: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised 
as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the 
exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any 
cause. 
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A jurisdictional challenge to certiorari in this matter is appropriate due to 
jurisdiction being raised in the district court, in the Court of Appeals, and, finally, now 
before this Court. "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time~ And jurisdiction, once 
challenged, cannot be assumed, and must be decided." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
495 F2d 906, 910. After that, once challenged, "[t]he burden shifts to the court to prove 
jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F2d 416. 
Appellate courts support the legitimacy of the justice system by serving as a 
mechanism of review. Trial courts make mistakes. Otherwise there wouldn't be 
appellate courts. See Zindler v. Buchanon, 61 A.2d 616, 618 (Mun. Ct. D.C. 1948). 
The framework of the federal courts, which Utah has used as an example, are such 
that "every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its 
own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review." United States 
v. LaBella, 15 M.J. 52. (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
The concept behind ''jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction" is that a court 
necessarily needs some power to decide whether it has jurisdiction or not. See Kevin M 
Clermont, Principles of Civil Procedure§§ 4.4, 5.1 (2d ed. 2009). 
The Court of Appeals, as the one charged with reviewing the district court's ruling, 
has the authority to review whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear the merits of an 
argument, or if there was jurisdiction of the lower court, otherwise, "a court without 
jurisdiction does not even have the right to be right."). Dane, Perry, 
"Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 23: Iss. 
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1, Article, ( 1994 ). 
As stated in the Utah Supreme Court case Garver v. Rosenberg: 
24. It is true that an appellate court is the ultimate judge of its own jurisdiction. See 
Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, ,r 9, 179 P.3d 799. 
In the federal courts, "[ c ]ongress has provided that only a "party" in the court of 
appeals may petition for a writ of certiorari." 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). Section 1254(1) reflects 
the ''well settled" rule that "only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become 
parties, may appeal an adverse judgment." Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988). 
The "party" requirement ensures that the entity seeking review has already demonstrated, 
in the proceedings below, that it satisfies the constitutional, statutory, and prudential 
requirements for participating in the lawsuit. 
Like the federal courts, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state petition for 
writ of certiorari in Utah requires that "[t]he petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, 
in the order indicated: (a)( I) a list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose 
judgment is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Supreme 
Court contains the names of all parties." (See Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Title 
VII, Rule 49, (a), (a)(l).) 
The Court of Appeals opinion stated in this matter that "because neither Clyde 
Snow nor Boyle were parties to the underlying action, they are not entitled to an appeal of 
right." See Utah Down Syndrome Found., 2012 UT 86 ,r 9. The Court of Appeals ruled 
there were no parties to the proceedings it reviewed. In the underlying district court case, 
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there was a void judgment, voiding the proceedings in the underlying case as if they had 
not happened. As a result, there was no proceeding that Clyde Snow's nonparty status 
provides a jurisdictional basis for that allows this Court a writ of certiorari. 
The Court of Appeals correctly statedthat118 Under similar circumstances, in 
Ostler v. Buhler, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial court's order to distribute 
settlement funds directly to an attorney was void because the attorney failed to properly 
intervene prior to judgment. Id. 19. 
119 On appeal, the attorney argued that the employee's failure to object to his 
motion for two years constituted waiver. Id. 1 6. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, 
clarifying that this was not a case in which the employee or the former employer, the 
parties to the action, allowed the attorney to participate. Id. ,Ml 7-9. 
Rather, the court explained, the case between the parties had ended before [the 
attorney] attempted to intervene. 19. It stated that ,the attorney's motions were post-
judgment motions that in no way affected the merits of the underlying action, its 
settlement, or its dismissal.' Id. Accordingly, the court held ,that the employee's failure to 
respond to the attorney's post-judgment motions did not constitute a waiver of his right to 
object to the trial court's attorney fees order,' and that because ,the attorney was not a 
party, ... the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order distribution of settlement proceeds to 
him.• Id. 120 Here, Clyde Snow did not engage in any of the underlying action or 
proceedings on its own behalf and, except for its interest in being paid for its work in 
representing Woodson, it had no stake in the subject matter. See Interstate Land Corp. v. 
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Patterson, 791 P .2d 110 I, 1107-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (requiring the interest of a party 
seeking to intervene as a matter of right to be ,a direct claim upon the subject matter of 
the action such that the applicant will either gain or lose by direct operation of the 
judgment to be rendered'). 
The Court of Appeals is correct that Clyde Snow did not intervene, and that Boyle, 
as a nonparty, had no appeal of right, and the Court could not review the merits of their 
arguments. If the Supreme Court, after its review, agrees Boyle and Clyde Snow were 
not parties to that proceeding, and everything that came before is void, then it appears 
there were "no parties to the proceeding" as defined by the plain language of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and there is no Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals followed the parameters in Utah Down Syndrome and did 
not allow a non-party an appeal of right and did not rule on the merits of the arguments of 
Boyle or Clyde Snow. 
Rather, on an inspection of the record while determining its jurisdiction and the 
jurisdiction of the district court, which is the duty of the appellate court, the Court of 
Appeals found ''the [district] court lacked jurisdiction to make orders with regard to their 
post-judgment motions. 
The Court of Appeals said it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits o(the parties. 
It did not say it was devoid of any inherent power or authority. 
A Texas appellate court ruled: "If the judgment is void because the trial court 
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lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we must declare the judgment void and dismiss the 
appeal because an appellate court has no jurisdiction to decide the merits of an appeal 
from a void judgment or order. See Mellon Serv. Co. v. Touche Ross Co., 946 S.W.2d 
862, 864, 870 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). If that is true, then the 
appellate court in this matter could have dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on 
the basis that the district court's post-judgment orders were void, as well as because 
nonparties did not have an appeal of right to have the merits of their arguments heard. But 
the judgment in the lower court would still be void. 
While lacking jurisdiction to decide the merits of the arguments of the nonparties, 
the Court had authority, and the duty, to inspect the record and in doing so, recognize a 
void judgment. Jurisdiction of a court is not completely synonymous with authority of 
court. And in this matter, the Court of Appeals, while lacking jurisdiction on the 
arguments of the merits, had the authority and duty to declare a void judgment void. 
In Valenta v. Regents of University of California (1991), the court states: [i]t is 
axiomatic that a judgment entered by a court which lacked jurisdiction is void and must 
be reversed. 
The Court of Appeals, in reviewing jurisdiction, did not act to make voidable the 
district court's orders. Those orders were void on their face. "Such a judgment has often 
been referred to as 'a dead limb upon the judicial tree." Moore v. Connecticut General 
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Life Ins. Co., 71 S.D. 512, 26 N.W.2d 691,693. 
There is well-settled law on this issue from courts around the country regarding the 
authority of a court to lop off the dead limb of a void judgment: 
Elliotv. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328,340, 26 U.S. 328,340 (1828): "Under Federal law which 
is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without 
authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, 
but simply void." 
A voidable order is an order that must be declared void by a judge to be void; a 
void order does not have to be declared void by a judge to be void. Only an 
inspection of the record of the case showing that the judge was without jurisdiction 
or violated a person's due process rights, or where fraud was involved in the 
attempted procurement of jurisdiction, is sufficient for an order to be void. Potenz 
Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill. App. 3d 617,525 N.E. 2d 173, 175 (1988). 
A court may set aside at any time a judgment or order void on its face." Thorson v. 
Western Development Corp. (Civ. No. 8052. Fourth Dist., Div. Two. May 19, 
1967.) 
The authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from Civ.R. 60(B) but 
rather constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts." Patton v. 
Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68. 
Courts also possess inherent power to set aside void judgments. (Rogers v. 
Silverman (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 1114, 1121 [265 Cal. Rptr. 286]. 
Courts also have inherent power to set aside a void judgment. Reid v. Baiter 
(1993) 1 4 Cal.App.4th 1 1 86, 1 I 94). 
Judgments entered where courts lack either subject matter jurisdiction, or that were 
otherwise entered in violation of due process oflaw, must be set aside. Jaffee v. 
Van Brunt, 158 F.R.D. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
47 
A void judgment is an absolute nullity that "may be attacked in any court, by any 
person, at any time. James v. lntown Ventures, LLC, 290 Ga. 813, 816(2) n. 5, 725 
S.E.2d 213 (2012). 
In Utah courts have rule: If judgment be void, it is open to collateral attack. 
Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301 (1967). 
A void judgment [ or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are 
divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all 
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any 
one. Bennettv. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514 [55 P. 390].) 
A "void" judgment. .. grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken 
thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack. No statute of 
limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby 
are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and 
rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound 
and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had 
never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604,354 
Mich. 97 (10/13/58). 
Everything that came from the void judgments of the district court, is dead and 
worthless. The Court of Appeals did not kill any judgments in the district court. As part 
of its review of jurisdiction, it simply stated the obvious about that which was already 
dead. 
The Court of Appeals accurately stated in its Opinion on page 13, footnote 4, that 
Clyde Snow offered "no legal authority to support the proposition that a non-party may 
achieve party status by filing a motion to interplead funds." There is continues to be no 
legal authority for Clyde Snow's attempt to achieve party status via on a writ for 
certiorari. 
Before this Supreme Court can act, it must determine if it has jurisdiction over 
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nonparties to a void judgment in a certiorari. The answer appears to be no. There is no 
iurisdiction for how a nonparty can become a party to a void iudgment. Clyde 
Snow's concession of its nonparty status has led to the law firm's decision to attempt to 
enforce its lien through filing a separate action as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 
as Clyde Snow & Sessions vs. Boyle, Thomas, et al, case number in the 3rd district court. 
T'60903744. Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Woodson are is a parties in that action and the 
district court has original jurisdiction over the matter. 
The Supreme Court, in its review of jurisdiction, must not do anything that gives 
effect to a district court's void judgment, giving rights where there were no rights, for that 
action itself would be void. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals was correct that because there was no proper intervention 
by Clyde Snow and no waiver, all post-judgment orders by the district court were void 
and that Boyle, as a nonparty to the underlying action, did not have an appeal of right. 
As a result, the court could not rule on the merits and arguments pertaining to the 
district court's findings regarding Clyde Snow's lien and the disbursement of funds 
because it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits and arguments and dismissed the 
appeal. After a review of the record, the Supreme Court should dismiss. The 3rd 
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District Court in the current matter Clyde Snow & Sessions, PC v. Thomas D. Boyle, et 
al, No.160903744 has jurisdiction over Clyde Snow, Boyle, and Woodson in enforcing 
Clyde Snow's lien. 
Based on the facts and arguments set forth above, the Boyle respectfully requests 
that this Court dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in granting of a writ of certiorari to gain 
jurisdiction over a nonparty where there was a void judgment and allow the civil action 
in the district court to proceed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 23 day ofDecember2016. 
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